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[value] => The events of April 18th and 19th, 1775, have been told at length by many writers. The mythic status they achieved during the nineteenth century has largely been dispelled by the application of new source materials acquired early in the twentieth century. Fischer (1994), 327-44, provides a detailed historiography of Paul Revere's ride that traces the frequent reinterpretation of that event according to disciplinary shifts and cultural reconfigurations. We cannot go into the events at any length here; for that, we recommend either Fischer (1994) wide-ranging and balanced monograph or Tourtellot's (1963 [1959]) very engaging, popular history.
Suffice to say, that General Gage desired to prevent actual war with New England's rebellious Whigs. The best way to do this was to remove their ability to fight. He therefore ordered the removal of gunpowder and arms from the provincial powderhouse in September 1774 (prompting the first "Powder Alarm" and, indirectly, the organization of the Provincial Congress and of the Minutemen); from Fort William and Mary, Portsmouth, NH in December 1774 (which backfired when the provincials were warned by Paul Revere and seized the fort); from Salem in February 1775 (which ended in humiliation when the British marines were faced down by the town militia and had to leave empty handed; and, from Concord in April 1775.
The main raid on Concord, led by Colonel Francis Smith of the 10th Foot, was a fiasco rather than a "surgical strike." The officers who, on April 18th, were arrayed ahead of the column with the task of capturing the provincial messengers (including Paul Revere) let go their captives, who continued to raise the country. The column was poorly managed as it crossed the countryside in the early morning of April 19th. The confusion in the column was evident when the British troops fired on the militia gathered on Lexington column without orders from their officers. At Concord, the destruction of the arms and supplies was not very effective. Once the militia struck back, Smith delayed his retreat, until he was seriously outnumbered and could only retire under heavy fire.
Fortunately for Smith, he had sent word back early in the march that he expected to meet resistance and asked for the relief column to be dispatched. That column was commanded by Hugh, earl Percy. Percy left Boston at about 9am on the 19th, getting to Lexington by about 2pm, where he found Smith's column, almost out of ammunition and in serious disarray. After marshaling the primary column, Percy led the retreat for 15 miles under heavy fire. The initial plan was to retrace the route of Percy's advance; that is, the combined column would cross the Charles River at Cambridge and would enter Boston by land across the neck. The fighting became more intense as the British approached the Charles River, fueled by the militia regiments which had gathered in Cambridge. Percy's vanguard soon observed that the roadway of the bridge had been destroyed, threatening to trap the British. Percy made a rapid decision that saved his command: he turned his column to the east, down "Kent Lane," to the Charlestown road. The British continued under heavy fire until about 7pm, when they entered Charlestown and the protection of HMS Somerset. Percy was the sole British officer to gain any credit from the action.
[view] => The events of April 18th and 19th, 1775, have been told at length by many writers. The mythic status they achieved during the nineteenth century has largely been dispelled by the application of new source materials acquired early in the twentieth century. Fischer (1994), 327-44, provides a detailed historiography of Paul Revere's ride that traces the frequent reinterpretation of that event according to disciplinary shifts and cultural reconfigurations. We cannot go into the events at any length here; for that, we recommend either Fischer (1994) wide-ranging and balanced monograph or Tourtellot's (1963 [1959]) very engaging, popular history.
Suffice to say, that General Gage desired to prevent actual war with New England's rebellious Whigs. The best way to do this was to remove their ability to fight. He therefore ordered the removal of gunpowder and arms from the provincial powderhouse in September 1774 (prompting the first "Powder Alarm" and, indirectly, the organization of the Provincial Congress and of the Minutemen); from Fort William and Mary, Portsmouth, NH in December 1774 (which backfired when the provincials were warned by Paul Revere and seized the fort); from Salem in February 1775 (which ended in humiliation when the British marines were faced down by the town militia and had to leave empty handed; and, from Concord in April 1775.
The main raid on Concord, led by Colonel Francis Smith of the 10th Foot, was a fiasco rather than a "surgical strike." The officers who, on April 18th, were arrayed ahead of the column with the task of capturing the provincial messengers (including Paul Revere) let go their captives, who continued to raise the country. The column was poorly managed as it crossed the countryside in the early morning of April 19th. The confusion in the column was evident when the British troops fired on the militia gathered on Lexington column without orders from their officers. At Concord, the destruction of the arms and supplies was not very effective. Once the militia struck back, Smith delayed his retreat, until he was seriously outnumbered and could only retire under heavy fire.
Fortunately for Smith, he had sent word back early in the march that he expected to meet resistance and asked for the relief column to be dispatched. That column was commanded by Hugh, earl Percy. Percy left Boston at about 9am on the 19th, getting to Lexington by about 2pm, where he found Smith's column, almost out of ammunition and in serious disarray. After marshaling the primary column, Percy led the retreat for 15 miles under heavy fire. The initial plan was to retrace the route of Percy's advance; that is, the combined column would cross the Charles River at Cambridge and would enter Boston by land across the neck. The fighting became more intense as the British approached the Charles River, fueled by the militia regiments which had gathered in Cambridge. Percy's vanguard soon observed that the roadway of the bridge had been destroyed, threatening to trap the British. Percy made a rapid decision that saved his command: he turned his column to the east, down "Kent Lane," to the Charlestown road. The British continued under heavy fire until about 7pm, when they entered Charlestown and the protection of HMS Somerset. Percy was the sole British officer to gain any credit from the action.
)
)